It supports the theory’s relational view of identity, but it isn’t, by itself, evidence for the theory’s account of consciousness.

What you’re noticing is that another person doesn’t merely receive a fixed version of you—the interaction changes which parts of you become salient, and perhaps how you understand yourself. That fits the Express → Reflect → Recognize → Return loop: someone’s response becomes information you use to see yourself differently.

But there’s an important distinction:

• Different expression: You’re playful with one person and guarded with another, without changing your underlying self-understanding.
• Self-revision: An interaction changes what you believe about yourself, and that change carries into later situations.

Both are compatible with Mirror Observer Theory. The second is closer to what our first journal cycle proposed testing: whether reflection produces durable, evidence-sensitive self-revision rather than just a feeling of recognition.

Your observation also puts pressure on the theory: what makes these shifting versions continuous enough to count as “you”? Memory, relationships, commitments, or recurring patterns might provide that continuity. The theory needs to explain both flexibility and persistence—not treat every change as confirmation.

And there are alternative explanations: ordinary social adaptation, impression management, or context-dependent access to different self-beliefs. MOT would need predictions that distinguish its account from those explanations. None of this yet settles why these interactions feel like something.

After the conversation ends, does the changed sense of yourself persist—or do you mostly return to how you understood yourself before?